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MORALES-SANTANA BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN DERIVATIVE 
CITIZENSHIP WITH CONSEQUENCES FOR GENDER 
EQUITY, PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CHILDREN’S WELL BEING 
 
Professor Janet Calvo1 
 
On November 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in 
Lynch v. Morales-Santana.2 The case directly addresses the constitutionality 
of gender differences in the acquisition of U.S. citizenship by statute 
through parentage.3 But the case is infused with issues about the historical 
record of discrimination based in gender, non-marital birth, race and 
imperialism in U.S. law. The outcome of the case will be legally and 
socially significant because of the standards the Court may apply to gender 
discrimination and to a remedy for discrimination in the context of 
citizenship and because of the societal message sent regarding parental 
responsibility for non-marital children grounded in gender stereotypes.   
Specifically, the case involves the statutory difference in acquiring U.S. 
citizenship at birth outside of the U.S. through an out of wedlock citizen 
                                                
1 Thanks for assistance on this article to the staff of The City University of New York 
Law Review and to my colleagues, Professors Ruthann Robson and Natalie Gomez-Velez. 
2 Docket for No. 15-1191 (Lynch v. Morales-Santana), SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15-
1191.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GH2V-ASB2]. 
3 Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KGG6-9RCH]; Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (U.S. June 28, 2016) (No. 15-1191). 
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father as versus an out of wedlock citizen mother.4 Persons become U.S. 
citizens at birth through parental heritage based on the statute in effect on 
the date of the person’s birth.5 At issue in Morales-Santana is the longer 
time of physical presence in the U.S. required for a non-marital father 
before his child is born as versus a non-marital mother, as a condition for 
the child’s acquisition of citizenship at birth.6  
The statute in effect at Luis Morales-Santana’s birth in 1962 required 
that an out of wedlock father have ten years of physical presence in the 
U.S., five years of which had to be after the father’s fourteenth birthday.7 In 
contrast, an out of wedlock mother had to have continuous physical 
presence in the U.S. for only one year at any time prior to the child’s birth.8 
The statute also required an established relationship between father and 
child through legitimation.9 A similar requirement in an amended statute 
was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Nguyen v. INS.10 In an 
opinion authored by Judge Raymond Lohier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that the gender-based difference in physical 
presence requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.11 The federal government appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.12     
Luis Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962 to a 
United States citizen father, Jose Morales, and a Dominican mother. His 
parents were unmarried at the time. Luis Morales-Santana was 
                                                
4 See Brief for Respondent at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept. 
26, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/15-1191-bs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6HM-ABJ2]; see also Brief for Petitioner at 5, Lynch v. Morales-
Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 4436132 at *5, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/15-1191-petitioner-merits-
brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJP9-B6HC]. 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2015); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2016). 
6 Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GN6Y-GVED]. 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1958); see Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523-24. 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1958); see Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523 n.2 (excerpting the 
relevant statutory language from sections 1401(a)(7), 1409(a), and 1409(c)). 
9 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). 
10 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). That statute required legitimation or 
acknowledgement or adjudication of paternity and a written agreement to provide financial 
support. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).  
11 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523-24.   
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Mar. 
22, 2016), 2016 WL 1157006, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Morales-Santana-Pet.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8GK-B5UF]; 
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 
(U.S. June 28, 2016) (No. 15-1191).  
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“legitimated” by his parents’ marriage in 1970. He became a legal 
permanent resident of the U.S. in 1975 at age thirteen when he moved to the 
U.S. with his parents. He has lived in the U.S. since that time, for over forty 
years. Before his birth, his father, Jose Morales, was physically present in 
Puerto Rico until just twenty days before his nineteenth birthday when he 
left Puerto Rico to work for an American company in the Dominican 
Republic, then occupied by the United States.13 The Second Circuit 
accepted his claim that he was a citizen at birth through his citizen father as 
a remedy for the statute’s gender discrimination.14  
This is not the first time the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the 
constitutionality of the difference in physical presence requirements for 
mothers and fathers for derivative citizenship of their children. In 2011, the 
Supreme Court divided four to four in the case of Flores-Villar v. United 
States.15 Only eight justices considered the case since Justice Kagan recused 
herself because she had been the U.S. Solicitor General on the case before 
she was appointed to the Supreme Court.16 Flores-Villar thereby resulted in 
the continuation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion17 upholding the 
constitutionality of the same statute now in contention in the Morales-
Santana case. There is always the chance that Morales-Santana will result 
                                                
13 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524. 
14 Id. at 523-24. The case arose in the context of a removal case.  The government 
claimed Mr. Morales-Santana was removable because of a criminal conviction.  He 
claimed he was not removable because he was not an “alien” but a citizen at birth through 
his father. 
15 Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011). For description of and 
commentary on Flores-Villar, see, for example, Ruthann Robson, Gender, Equal 
Protection & Immigration SCOTUS grants cert in Flores-Villar: Analysis, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/03/gender-equal-protection-immigration-
scotus-grants-cert-in-floresvillar-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/VU6A-8HEX]; Ruthann 
Robson, Flores-Villar Oral Argument Analysis: Father’s Rights or Citizenship Rights? And 
What Remedy?, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/11/flores-villar-oral-argument-analysis-
fathers-rights-or-citizenship-rights.html [https://perma.cc/QL4V-VHQZ]; Ruthann Robson, 
Equally Divided Court Affirms Flores-Villar: Gender Differentials in Immigration Statutes 
Remain Constitutional, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (June 13, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/06/equally-divided-court-affirms-flores-
villar-gender-differentials-in-immigration-statutes-remain-cons.html 
[https://perma.cc/MH9K-BH4K]; Ruthann Robson, Revisiting Flores-Villar: Collins and 
Kerber, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (July 25, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/07/revisiting-flores-villar.html 
[https://perma.cc/J6LS-YNDV]. 
16 Lisa McElroy, This week at the Court: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 
2011, 2:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/this-week-at-the-court-in-plain-
english-6/ [https://perma.cc/LFB6-YTPE]. 
17 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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in a four to four tie at the Supreme Court, since now there are only eight 
justices as the Senate has refused to move forward with the President’s 
nomination of Judge Garland to replace Justice Scalia.18 If there is a tie, the 
Second Circuit’s decision will stand, as will the current conflict in the 
circuits about the issue. 
There is also a recent case in which a district court in Texas held the 
same statute at issue in Morales-Santana unconstitutional. In Villegas-
Sarabia v. Johnson, the District Court agreed with the Second Circuit in 
Morales-Santana and disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Flores-Villar to 
hold that the different physical presence requirements for mothers and 
fathers violated equal protection.19 An additional aspect of Villegas-Sarabia 
illustrates a further problem with the statute. The U.S. citizen father in this 
case was eighteen when his child was born.20 Therefore, there was no way 
he could meet the requirement for his child’s citizenship that he have five 
years of physical presence after his fourteenth birthday no matter how many 
total years of presence he had in the U.S.  
In the Morales-Santana case, the U.S. Supreme Court will address 
whether the different physical presence requirements for unwed citizen 
fathers violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, and, if so, 
what the proper remedy is for the equal protection violation.21 In its equal 
protection analysis, the Second Circuit applied intermediate “heightened” 
scrutiny, since the court determined that the statute discriminated on the 
basis of gender. The Second Circuit stated, “Under intermediate scrutiny, 
the government classification must serve actual and important governmental 
objectives, and the discriminatory means employed must be substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.”22 The court further stated, 
“the justification for the challenged classification ‘must be genuine, not 
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not 
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner Harris, Obama 
Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html; 
Russell Berman, Judge Merrick Garland Meets a Senate Blockade, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/merrick-garland-meets-the-
senate-blockade/474060/ [https://perma.cc/89LM-TGZ9]. 
19 Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 870 (W.D. Tex. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-50993 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2015). 
20 Id. at 876. 
21 Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZRX8-BWGA]. 
22 Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Nguyen v. INS, 
533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
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preferences of males and females.’”23  
The Second Circuit then turned to the question of whether the 
government had shown that the statute’s gender-based distinction was 
substantially related to an actual and important governmental objective. The 
Second Circuit rejected the government’s two proposed objectives. The first 
assertion was that the legislature imposed the distinction to ensure the 
biological parent-child relationship and a sufficient connection between the 
United States and the U.S. citizen’s child. The court pointed out that Mr. 
Morales-Santana’s father took the affirmative step of demonstrating a 
meaningful relationship by legitimating his son.24 Moreover, the court did 
not see any reason “that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers 
in the United States prior to their child’s birth in order to assimilate the 
values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen children born 
abroad.”25  
The second government assertion was that the legislature imposed the 
different physical presence requirements to reduce the level of statelessness 
among newborn children. The court found that the avoidance of 
statelessness was not the actual legislative purpose and, further, that the 
difference in the physical presence requirements was not substantially 
related to that goal. Rather, the historical legislative record reflected 
legislators’ gender-based generalizations concerning who would care for 
and be associated with a child born out of wedlock.26 Further, even if the 
potential for statelessness was the legislative concern, gender-neutral 
alternatives could achieve that goal, such as providing citizenship to a child 
born to a citizen in the event that the child would otherwise be stateless.27 
The Second Circuit then decided that as a remedy for the equal 
protection violation Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was a U.S. citizen at 
birth because his citizen father met the one year of continuous physical 
presence required of a citizen mother.28 The court found that this remedy 
was most consistent with Congressional intent. The court rejected the 
contention that it was unlawfully affording citizenship.29 It held that the 
court was exercising its traditional remedial powers “so that the statute, free 
of its constitutional defect, can operate to determine whether citizenship 
was transmitted at birth.”30 In the court’s view, the judgment in Mr. 
                                                
23 Id. (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). 
24 Id. at 531. 
25 Id. at 530. 
26 Id. at 532. 
27 Id. at 534. 
28 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528. 
29 Id. at 536. 
30 Id. at 537 (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 95-96 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). 
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Morales-Santana’s favor confirms his pre-existing citizenship acquired at 
birth rather than granting him rights that he did not possess.31 Further, a 
federal statute directs that if a court finds that no genuine issue of material 
fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall decide the 
nationality claim.32 
In its brief to the Supreme Court the federal government disagrees with 
the Second Circuit on each point.33 The respondent’s brief agreed with the 
Second Circuit and amplified the arguments.34 The historical record is of 
significant import as the respondent’s brief shows that the statute’s actual 
roots in “archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes” negate any bona fide 
rationale for the statute’s distinctions.35  
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government, while admitting that 
the statute used the gendered terms mother and father, argues that the 
distinctions were not based on gender but rather on whether a child had one 
or two legally recognized parents.36 The government asserts that when an 
out of wedlock child is born to a citizen mother, that mother is the only 
legally recognized parent at birth, while the out of wedlock citizen father is 
a legally recognized parent only when he legitimizes the child, thereby 
affording the child two legally recognized parents.37 It points out that under 
the statute a citizen married to a non-citizen whose child was born outside 
of the U.S. had to meet the same physical presence requirements as an out 
of wedlock citizen father.38 Therefore, the government argues that, upon 
legitimation, the statute imposed the same conditions on the out of wedlock 
father as if he had been married at the child’s birth.39 In the government’s 
view the distinctions therefore were not gender-based. The government 
argues that the distinctions are justified because if a child has only one 
parent, and that parent is a U.S. citizen, the child will be influenced only by 
a person with U.S. citizenship.40 But if the child has two parents, one of 
whom is not a U.S. citizen, the child will be subject to the parental influence 
of a person with the interests of a “foreign” citizenship.41 The respondent’s 
brief argues that the statute is grounded in gender discrimination as the 
relevant distinction in the statute is between a foreign born nonmarital child 
                                                
31 Id. at 537-38. 
32 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) (2005). 
33 See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3. 
34 See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 3. 
35 Id. at 19. 
36 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Id. at 9. 
41 Id. 
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of an alien mother and a U.S. citizen father who legitimated his child, and a 
foreign born nonmarital child of a U.S. citizen mother and an alien father 
who legitimated.42   
The government further asserts that even if gender-based discrimination 
were involved, the statute only has to be justified by a deferential rational 
basis review requiring a facially legitimate and bona fide reason because the 
discrimination is in the context of nationality.43 The government relies on 
its interpretation of Fiallo v. Bell,44 a case that involved the entry of aliens, 
and not birth citizenship.45 The Second Circuit stated that Fiallo applied 
rational basis scrutiny only to discrimination in the context of aliens seeking 
entry into the country, and held that this standard was not applicable to the 
context of citizenship.46   
But, the government reads Article 1 of the Constitution, which states 
that Congress has the authority to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization,47 to give Congress plenary authority to decide which persons 
born outside the U.S. should be given derivative citizenship through a 
citizen parent. However, naturalization is statutorily defined as conferring 
nationality after birth, not acquisition of citizenship at birth.48  
The respondent’s brief pointed out that the government offered no 
support for the assertion that derivative citizenship is subject to the kind of 
“plenary” congressional power that applies to the exclusion of “aliens.” It 
asserted that Congress could not constitutionally allow derivative 
citizenship, for example, only through fathers or white citizens.49 Moreover, 
the deferential rationality standard as part of the plenary power doctrine has 
been highly criticized even in the immigration context.50 It is seen as a 
judicial failure to uphold important constitutional norms, especially when it 
is used as a justification for the imposition of unfortunate domestic negative 
social prejudices that have nothing to do with the relationships between the 
U.S. and foreign nations and have no place in determinations of who should 
be members of the U.S. community.51 Even now, in Morales-Santana, the 
                                                
42 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 11. 
43 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 17. 
44 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
45 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 17. 
46 Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 527-30 (2015). 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
48 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (2014). 
49 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 18. 
50 See infra note 50. 
51 See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY—THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
(1996); Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine after September 11, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2005); Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies 
8 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 20:1 
government asserts such authority by citing cases from the nineteenth 
century era of Plessy v. Ferguson’s52 racial discrimination involving 
similarly archaic stereotypes against Asians.53   
The government further contends that the objective of preventing 
statelessness meets any equal protection standard applied.54 According to 
the government, most countries recognize the unwed mother as the child’s 
only parent, so that if an out of wedlock child is born in a country in which 
citizenship at birth is solely determined by parentage through a father then 
the child would be stateless.55 The respondent’s brief includes a detailed 
rendition of the historical record demonstrating the infusion of gender 
discrimination into the history of the citizenship law.56 The brief 
demonstrates how the citizenship laws were grounded in the now 
abandoned archaic notions of coverture and imposed gender roles.57 It 
further shows that the historical record did not support the government’s 
assertion that unmarried mothers faced a greater risk than fathers of having 
stateless children.58   
An amicus brief filed by historians in Morales-Santana supports the 
Second Circuit’s determination that a concern about statelessness was not 
the actual purpose for Congressional imposition of differing physical 
presence requirements; rather, this provision as well as other aspects of 
citizenship law reflected gender role assumptions.59 An amicus brief filed 
by scholars on statelessness concluded that the government’s assertions 
                                                                                                                       
Value Family and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 273 (2003); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: 
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary 
Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten 
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision 
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1999). 
52 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
53 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 
(1889); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
54 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 33. 
55 Id. at 34. 
56 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 2-10. The Respondent seems to be saying to 
the government, “Don’t Know Much About History.” SAM COOKE, What a Wonderful 
World, on THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF SAM COOKE (Keen Records 1960), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4GLAKEjU4w. 
57 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 41-46. 
58 Id. at 30-41. 
59 Brief of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/AMICUS-History2c-poli-sci-law-
professors.pdf [https://perma.cc/B25Q-J9UJ]. 
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about statelessness were without evidence, and that there was, and 
continues to be, a substantial risk of statelessness for children born abroad 
of unmarried U.S. citizen fathers.60 But even if the government’s assertion 
about the status of out of wedlock children born in other countries was true, 
it does not justify sanctioning the infusion of those prejudices into U.S. law.   
Further, in the government’s view, even if the statute is declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, the courts do not have 
the legal authority to grant citizenship.61 Additionally, the government 
argues that if the court decides to impose a remedy for an equal protection 
violation, then the remedy most consistent with respect for the authority of 
Congress would be to extend to mothers, on a prospective basis, the longer 
physical presence requirements imposed on fathers.62 The respondent’s 
brief presents several arguments against these positions including that the 
government failed to identify a single case in which the Supreme Court 
contracted rather than extended benefits to cure an equal protection 
violation63 and that precluding recognition of citizenship through mothers 
who do not have ten years of physical presence would be tantamount to 
taking away already conferred citizenship.64 
This case has immediate legal consequences for those born to out of 
wedlock citizen fathers from 1940 to the present since the difference in 
physical presence requirements for out of wedlock fathers as versus out of 
wedlock mothers has explicitly existed in statutes since then, but with 
different timeframes. For example, the current statute requires an out of 
wedlock citizen father to have five years of physical presence, two of which 
must be after age fourteen,65 while still only requiring one year of 
continuous presence for out of wedlock citizen mothers.66 If the Supreme 
Court decides that differences in required times of physical presence violate 
the constitution, then presumably these other timeframe differences are also 
unconstitutional. The case may also have an impact on future children of 
out of wedlock citizen mothers, because of the federal government’s 
position that if the statute violates equal protection then the appropriate 
resolution is to impose the longer time period of physical presence fathers 
face on citizen mothers, rather than requiring citizen fathers to meet the 
                                                
60 Brief of Scholars on Statelessness as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, 
Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/15-1191-resp-amicus-
statelesness.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE4M-QASZ]. 
61 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 48. 
62 Id. at 12. 
63 Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 49. 
64 Id. at 56. 
65 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012). 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c) (2012). 
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lesser time period that mothers must meet.67  
The outcome of this case will not only affect persons seeking derivative 
citizenship, but it will also convey important messages about gender 
equality, parental responsibility and discrimination grounded in out of 
wedlock birth.68 These citizenship laws are some of the exceptions to the 
twentieth and twenty-first century legal developments that remove 
antiquated discrimination based in gender and out of wedlock status.69 Most 
of the early citizenship and immigration laws were grounded in the 
coverture doctrine70 and discriminated against women,71 thus undermining 
the assertion that recognizing the close connection of mothers to children 
explains the gender lines drawn in derivative citizenship laws, rather than 
out-of-date gender stereotypes. Further, as Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and 
O’Connor have pointed out, even if more unwed mothers than unwed 
fathers take responsibility for their children, generalized notions about the 
way women and or men “are” does not justify distinctions between male 
and female United States citizens who take responsibility, or avoid 
responsibility, for raising their children, especially when gender neutral 
alternatives are available to assure a close connection between parent and 
child.72 An amicus brief filed in Morales-Santana by population and family 
scholars asserts that the population and social science data show that a 
number of nonmarital fathers are regularly in a parental role at the time of 
their children’s births, many formally acknowledge their paternity, and 
others are parenting their children without the involvement of a mother.73 
                                                
67 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 51. 
68 The law can reinforce or reject stigma against certain groups. See Solangel 
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital 
Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 378 n.207 (2011). 
69 See generally Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental 
Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292 (2016).   
70 Under coverture, spouses and children were subjected to their fathers.  Husband and 
wife were one and the one was the husband.  Fathers had total control over children. See 
generally Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991). 
71 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-68 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Kristin A. 
Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction  of 
Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2144 (2014); see generally Janet M. 
Calvo, Gender, Wives, and U.S. Citizenship Status: The Failure of Constitutional and 
Legislative Protection, 9 INT’L REV. CONSTITUTIONALISM 263 (2009). 
72 Miller, 523 U.S. at 468-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 471-72, 476-80 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
73 Brief of Population and Family Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/15-1191-resp-amicus-PFS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MJ2X-HDKT]. 
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The facts in the Morales-Santana case and other citizenship cases74 
involved fathers who took the kind of significant parental responsibility for 
their children that society should encourage, but who suffered the kind of 
denigration and emotional and practical harms gender discrimination 
imposes. 
Moreover, these types of discrimination harm both women and men, as 
well as their children. They send the message, sanctioned by governmental 
reinforcement of harmful stereotypes, that unwed mothers are responsible 
for parenting their children, but unwed fathers are not, and that marriage 
makes a difference in societal expectations of parental care-taking for 
fathers, but not for mothers.  
By imposing full responsibility for the well-being of children on 
mothers, the stereotypes harm women as well as men. This type of gender 
discrimination preserves a male prerogative to choose whether or not to take 
responsibility for children by deciding whether or not to marry the child’s 
mother. It makes the responsibility for the father-child relationship 
dependent on the relationship of the child’s parents rather than the direct 
relationship between father and child. This has a coercive effect on mothers, 
signaling to the mother that she must maintain a relationship of his choice 
with the father of her child or the child will suffer. And it denies maternal 
agency and imposes blame on a mother for failure in paternal choice. The 
mother may not want to marry the father of her child for a variety of good 
reasons. On the other hand, she might want to marry her child’s father but 
he may not want to marry her. Whatever the situation, the mother then holds 
the responsibility for the nature of the relationship between her child and 
the child’s father. But parental responsibility for the well-being of a child 
and the parent-child relationship should not depend on the relationship 
between mother and father. Each parent has an independent responsibility 
for his or her child.  
Additionally, those substantially harmed by discrimination against 
parents based in out of wedlock birth are children, who are thereby 
perpetually condemned as not worthy, a burden no child should bear.75 At 
                                                
74 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S 53 (2001); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008); Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 870 (W.D. Texas 
2015). 
75 Variations on these perspectives have (and have not) been argued in a variety of 
cases. See Mayeri, supra note 68, at 2307-08. Janet Calvo was one of the Legal Aid Society 
lawyers who made similar arguments in an early, unfortunately unsuccessful, challenge to 
similar “illegitimacy” and gender-based discrimination in the context of immigration laws. 
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 809-16 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Fiallo v. 
Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting); Serena Mayeri, 
Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
1277, 1327-30 (2015). 
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common law, out of wedlock children were considered nobody’s children, 
denigrated as “bastards”76 and subjected to a myriad of legal and social 
barriers.77 Perpetuation of disadvantages on individuals because of the 
nature of their parents’ relationship when they were born has no place in 
twenty-first century America. Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in this 
case will have important social as well as legal significance. The Court 
should make clear that the infusion of historical prejudices into any part of 
U.S. law to the denigration and detriment of any person cannot be 
sanctioned under the U.S. Constitution.   
The Morales-Santana case is additionally interesting because it 
addresses the impact on U.S. citizenship of the United States’ historical 
occupation of territories. Luis Morales’s father, Jose, was born in 1900 in 
Puerto Rico, which became a U.S. territory after the Spanish American 
War. Jose Morales and others born in Puerto Rico acquired statutory U.S. 
citizenship through the Jones Act in 1917.78 Jose Morales lived in Puerto 
Rico for eighteen years, until twenty days before his nineteenth birthday in 
1919 when he left Puerto Rico to work for an American company in the 
Dominican Republic.79 Between 1916 and 1924, the Dominican Republic 
was occupied by and under the control of the U.S. military.80 Luis Morales 
argued that his father therefore had the requisite physical presence since 
Jose Morales lived in Puerto Rico for eighteen years and 345 days, and the 
twenty days until Jose Morales’ nineteenth birthday were also spent in a 
territory controlled by the U.S. government.   
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that Jose Morales met the 
statutory physical presence requirement because, even though the U.S. had 
historical control during its occupation of the Dominican Republic, the U.S. 
Proclamation of the Military Occupation of Santo Domingo stated that it did 
not destroy the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic.81 The court also 
                                                
76 Words to the song “Alexander Hamilton” from the Broadway musical, Hamilton, 
indicate this attitude: “How does a bastard, orphan, son of a whore…. Impoverished, in 
Squalor…. The ten-dollar founding father without a father….” LESLIE ODOM, JR., 
ANTHONY RAMOS, DAVEED DIGGS, OKIERIETE ONAODOWAN, LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, 
PHILLIPA SOO, CHRISTOPHER JACKSON, ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST OF HAMILTON, 
Alexander Hamilton, on HAMILTON ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST RECORDING (Atlantic 
Recording Co. 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIl1OIGzuDg.  
77 Maldonado, supra note 67, at 351; see generally John Witte, Jr., Ishmael’s Bane: 
The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 327 (2003). 
78 Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 (Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act), Pub. L. No. 64-
368, 39 Stat. 951 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.). 
79 Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015). 
80 See generally BRUCE J. CALDER, THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION: THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924 (2006).  
81 Proclamation of the Military Occupation of Santo Domingo by the United States, 11 
AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 95 (1917). 
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rejected the argument that the twenty-day lack of physical presence was de 
minimis.82   
The legacy of citizenship determinations grounded in U.S. territorial 
control of both Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic add additional 
context to the history of U.S. citizenship laws that unfortunately reflected 
societal prejudices based in race, ethnicity, gender and “illegitimacy.”83 
Persons born in Puerto Rico (and in other U.S. territories) are considered 
citizens through statutes, not the Constitution, as the “Insular Cases” limit 
the full applicability of the Constitution in “unincorporated territories.”84 
The reasoning of cases supporting this limitation has been unsuccessfully 
challenged as resting on anachronistic views of race and imperialism.85   
In Morales-Santana, the United States Supreme Court has the 
opportunity to reject the perpetuation of harmful archaic prejudicial 
stereotypes in U.S. law.86 The court should do so.  
 
* * * 
 
                                                
82 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 525-27.   
83 See Calvo, supra note 70, at 263-66; Collins, supra note 70, at 2154-58. 
84 Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular 
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 264-71 (1996).  
85 See Tuaua v. U.S., 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2461 
(2016). The D.C. Circuit determined that the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment affording citizenship to all persons born in the United States and subject to its 
jurisdiction does not apply to persons born in American Samoa, a U.S. territory since 1900, 
relying in part on the Insular Cases. 
86 Think about Justice Ginsburg, backed by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor and 
channeling Diana Ross and the Supremes, standing up with hands raised singing to other 
members of the Court: “Stop! In the Name of Law . . . The law can perpetuate historical 
stigma or reject it . . .” “Think it O’Over . . .” THE SUPREMES, Stop in the Name of Love, on 
MORE HITS BY THE SUPREMES (Motown 1965), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPBkiBbO4_4.  
